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INTRODUCTION
Innovation is concerned with processes of learning and discovery involv-
ing new products, new production methods and new forms of economic 
organization. In turn, research efforts by business firms are shaped by 
the rates and criteria that financial markets and financial institutions 
use to allocate resources to enterprises. However, little is known about 
the specificities of the links between finance and the microeconomics of 
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innovation. While the widespread belief is that innovation needs finance, 
its role varies widely according to the size and age of the innovative firm, 
as well as the sector and the stage within the industry’s life cycle.
While the great majority of studies have focused on the links between 
finance and growth from a very stylized macroeconomic perspective, rely-
ing on international comparisons with little attention to the institutional 
details (see for instance Levine, 2003), there is indeed older literature, which 
attempts to identify “ideal types” in terms of the specificities of the main 
financing channels (banks, stock markets, private equity), pioneered by 
Rybczynski (1974) and Zysman (1984) who distinguished two archetypal 
financial systems, namely “market-based” or “credit-based” systems.
This article discusses some of the implications in terms of innovation and 
the evolutionary dynamics of these two systems proposed by Dosi (1990). 
Distinctive features include the relatively “impersonal” relations of the 
market-based archetype as opposed to the more institutionalized owner-
ship/control relationships in the credit-based system. Mapping the dis-
tinct archetypes across different historical experiences, it is conjectured 
that the credit-based system may have been more conducive to cumulative 
learning, while market-based systems may have been a better fit for the 
exploration of new technological paradigms.
25 years later however, financial systems have undergone major transfor-
mations, which fall under the rubric of financialization, possibly challeng-
ing the current relevance of the distinction between the two archetypes. 
In what follows, we offer a preliminary assessment of the recent changes 
in financial systems and their impact on the nexus between financial set-
ups and industrial dynamics.
The first section revisits the results and conjectures put forth by Dosi 
(1990), centered on an “evolutionary taxonomy” of the two financial arche-
types and on their comparative dynamic properties. The second section 
reviews evidence related to the role of finance in driving industry-level 
and firm-level innovation and growth. In the third section, we explore 
the financialization process and its spread from the Anglo-Saxon world 
to those economies that have historically more so resembled the “credit-
based” archetype. Finally, the fourth section concludes our findings.
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1. THE EVOLUTIONARY PROPERTIES  
OF DIFFERENT FINANCIAL SYSTEMS
Dosi (1990) revisits the old question: “Do financial institutions matter in 
terms of the levels and changes within real aggregate variables?” There are 
two complementary ways of answering such a question. The first is pre-
dominantly macro and concerns the role of specific financial institutions, 
or lack thereof, in stimulating or impeding long-term economic develop-
ment (the question dates back at least to Kindleberger, 1984). The second 
regards the modes through which industrial growth is financed. As men-
tioned, in this respect Rybczynski (1974) proposed a taxonomy which dif-
ferentiates “market-based” systems from “credit-based” systems. In the for-
mer, taking the USA and UK as prime examples, corporate growth is more 
frequently financed through traded shares and retained profits. In the lat-
ter archetype, which heralds the experience of continental Europe (espe-
cially Germany) and Japan, long-term bank loans and long-term ownership 
claims by banks and other financial institutions are considered to be rela-
tively more significant sources of corporate financing. In turn, particular 
forms of ownership and finance are likely to affect microeconomic patterns 
of production, investment and research and, ultimately, performance out-
comes, even when firms are faced with the same set of economic incentives.
1.1. The evolutionary taxonomy of financial systems
Within the more orthodox contributions to the literature, real aggregate 
dynamics are unaffected by the specific blend of financial institutions 
catering to business. Rational agents have access to all available informa-
tion and succeed in exploiting all the available opportunities. Thus aggre-
gate dynamics are solely influenced by the exogenous dynamics of eco-
nomic fundamentals. However, it is sufficient to relax the assumption of 
perfect information to show that specific institutions do actually matter, 
as they convey information, generate incentives and guide the allocation 
of resources. This entails certain outcomes, as (i) incentives, allocations 
and performances rely on the institutional set-up of each system; (ii) equi-
libria depend on specific information flows and the beliefs of agents, and 
may yield Pareto dominated allocations with resource rationing and an 
absence of market clearing; and (iii) learning processes generally engen-
der non-convexities, multiplicity and even non-existence of equilibria.
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The monumental work by Stiglitz and Greenwald (2014) amply discusses 
these ubiquitous properties, which even more so apply to evolutionary 
environments in which previously unknown states of the world are them-
selves the result of the innovative activities of agents.
Innovative processes in such non-stationary worlds are characterized by 
knowledge tacitness, and are path-dependent and institution-dependent 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982; Dosi, 1988; Dosi and Nelson, 2010). Agents search 
within the grounds of what they already know or believe they know, mak-
ing mistakes and obtaining unexpected successes. Collectively, product 
markets and financial markets operate as selection devices among differ-
ent firms embodying different technologies. Aggregate performances of 
the system change over time much like self-organizing collective prop-
erties resulting from the interactions amongst diverse agents typically 
under disequilibrium conditions.
Ultimately, innovative environments are driven by two processes, namely 
learning and selection. Indeed, the differences in structures and perfor-
mances across industries can be understood as the result of the different 
balances between, and modes of, such processes. Finance of course matters 
in so far as it has an impact upon firms’ learning patterns, the allocation of 
resources to different organizations employing different technologies and 
strategies, and finally upon the various competitive dynamics across firms.
Financial selection should plausibly satisfy some weak efficiency criterion 
and reward/punish according to revealed performances. Nevertheless, 
in non-stationary evolutionary worlds, long-term aggregate performance 
might not be monotonic within the efficiency of the selection rules used 
by financial investors. It could well be that departures from efficiency cri-
teria based upon past and present environments may be necessary in order 
to nurture future innovativeness. Consequently, financial systems may 
face permanent dilemmas between efficiency and evolutionary viability 
(allowing that some innovation will emerge in the future and ultimately 
be more fit for that future environment). In other words, trade-offs exist 
between static efficiency (the opportunity costs of given resources at any 
one time) and Schumpeterian efficiency (the ability of economic systems 
to continuously generate innovation and adapt to unforeseen changes). 
Empirical environments are most likely to fall somewhere in between two 
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extreme scenarios whereby in the first, the technological winner today 
would also be, with probability one, the winner of tomorrow, and in the 
second, today’s winners will surely be tomorrow’s losers. Hence, the finan-
cial system is permanently facing a dilemma between making the best use 
of today’s information and resources on one side, and gambling on unex-
plored opportunities on the other side.
Dosi (1990) has explored the two “market-based” and “credit-based” arche-
types of financial systems from this evolutionary perspective. A mar-
ket-based system can be described as a relatively “impersonal” system of 
exchanges of ownership titles. Credit-based systems involve more “insti-
tutionalized” ownership/control relationships. Using Hirschman’s dichot-
omy, market-based financing relies more on exit mechanisms, while credit-
oriented systems rely more on voice mechanisms, based on the possibilities 
for partners to exchange information, discuss, and negotiate (Hirschman, 
1970). Taking into account the features of the innovation process (collec-
tive, cumulative, tacit, uncertain), the financial allocation mechanism 
itself may involve specific competencies, especially in credit-based sys-
tems, at which point learning becomes relatively more important than 
selection. On the other side, market-based systems seem to lead more eas-
ily to the exploration of new technological paradigms, through important 
caveats that innovative opportunities must be high and innovative capa-
bilities well diffused throughout the economy.
In either system, long-term dynamism requires the persistent exploration 
of new potential paradigms and new technological trajectories. In some 
market-led systems, the allocation of resources to innovative research has 
become disconnected institutionally from “normal” credit activities with 
the emergence and development of venture capital markets. Venture capi-
tal is an institutional innovation that, in principle, ought to increase the 
allocating capacities of “specialized investors”, and reduce uncertainty by 
spreading risk over investment portfolios. In credit-based countries, the 
financing channel has historically been much less divided. Banks have 
been important for both the processes of support for the growth and 
learning of incumbents and the exploration by new entrants. Moreover, in 
countries like Japan the exploration of new products, processes and organ-
izational arrangements has historically been inbuilt into the dynamic capa-
bilities of large established companies.
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Note also that whatever the nature of the financial system (whether it 
more closely resembles the idealized credit-based system or the pure mar-
ket-based system), a great part of business-performed innovative research 
has historically taken place (and continues to do so) in established firms. 
As such, incumbent firms access external financial resources, whenever 
they have the need, as whole entities, based on the grounds of their over-
all performance and without respect to the individual projects.
In summary, and with the aforementioned caveats in mind, in a 
Schumpeterian perspective the differences between the two systems of 
financial allocation are based on the relative importance of learning ver-
sus selection; voice versus exit; and discretionary versus non-discretion-
ary allocative rules.
1.2. Dynamic properties
As a way of assessing the properties of the different architectures of the 
finance-industry nexus, Dosi (1990) put forward three conjectures, based 
on historical evidence:
 i.  The more knowledge is asymmetric, appropriable and scarce, the 
more institutionalized processes of financial allocation will be con-
ducive to evolutionary viability. Formal bank-industry relation-
ships have historically appeared to be commonplace in industrializ-
ing countries, requiring long-term commitments of resources to the 
accumulation of technological capacities that are often not quite up 
to speed in catching-up countries.
 ii.  A necessary, even if not sufficient, condition for the “Schumpeterian 
efficiency” of a market-based system is that it operates in a country 
which is either on or near the technological frontier.
 iii.  Financial institutions in credit-based systems, in primis banks, need 
not only be “patient” in order to be dynamically viable, they also 
need to acquire relatively detailed knowledge about the progress tra-
jectories of individual industries, in addition to the internal compe-
tences and innovative projects of individual firms.
Table 1 presents some of the distinctive properties of different stylized 
financial systems.
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Table 1. An evolutionary taxonomy of financial systems  
and their properties
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Source: Dosi (1990, p. 315).
As for selection, similar financial indicators across financial systems may 
produce different implications for dynamic performances. All things being 
equal, it would also be expected that in credit based systems industrial 
growth would occur to a greater extent via the diversification of exist-
ing companies, while in market-based systems the pressure to specialize 
in highly profitable activities would be greater. One can presume that the 
more financial markets matter and the more efficient they become, the 
higher the pressure against uncompetitive activities and firms will be.
Generally, the “Schumpeterian” implication regarding the distinction 
between market-based and credit-based economies is that the former ought 
to be comparatively more engaged in technological exploration and be rel-
atively more exposed to market selection pressures. Does the evidence 
also bear this conjecture in light of the institutional transformations in 
the international financial sector? The following section will review the 
empirical nexus between finance, innovation, and industrial dynamics, 
drawing on evidence produced over the last 25 years.
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2. AN EMPIRICAL OVERVIEW  
ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN  
FINANCIAL CONDITIONS,  
AND FIRM-LEVEL INNOVATION AND GROWTH
Let us begin by reviewing some both reasonable and misleading proxies 
for “market-basedness”.
2.1. The elusive proxies for financial development
The common practice of equating stock market capitalization with degrees 
of “financial development”, as done by Levine (1997) and the references 
therein, has been criticized from within the very mainstream camp that 
generated it. Champonnois (2010) argues that indicators of an aggregate 
financial structure are endogenous to the firm ecology and the associ-
ated patterns of financing decisions. Koetter and Wedow (2010) remark 
that most studies in this field are unable to measure the quality of finan-
cial intermediation. Far from being merely an econometric issue, this dif-
ficulty is rooted in the impossibility of codifying all the relevant infor-
mation, a problem (roughly) addressed by credit-based systems through 
long-term networks of relations between financial agents and firms. 
Arcand et al. (2015) have observed a negative finance-growth nexus for 
high-income countries, motivating them to talk of a “vanishing effect 
of financial development”. High income countries may have reached the 
point at which financial depth no longer enables the efficiency of invest-
ments to increase (Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011). In contrast, it may even 
be harmful as, for example, it diverts talented individuals from innova-
tive industries. As argued by Arcand et al. (2015), “There are several coun-
tries for which smaller financial sectors would actually be desirable”.
Basically, even in the mainstream quarter there is an acknowledgment 
that increases in developed financial markets are neither a sign of a 
higher level of development, nor a harbinger of further growth in the 
future (see also Levine, 2003). Indeed, any reasonable observer of the con-
nections between financial innovation as “weapon of mass destruction” 
(Warren Buffett dixit) and the 2008 financial crisis, can testify that the 
statement is just straightforward common sense.
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Aglietta and Scialom (2010), for instance, illustrate very well how finan-
cial innovations generated predatory behaviors and triggered the 2008 
crisis. “In the so-called ‘subprime’ crisis, a powerful pro-cyclical dynamic 
was engineered by the intimate interaction of a host of financial inno-
vations: mark-to-market of a wide range of financial assets that has 
enhanced credit against collateral, widespread use of credit derivatives 
that has allowed the securitization of about any type of credit, internal 
models of credit risk control based upon the Value-at-Risk (VaR) princi-
ple that has immoderately propelled leveraged trading portfolios” (p. 43). 
Granted that this description sums up well our analysis, let us move on to 
assessing the differences in Schumpeterian efficiency, if any, across dif-
ferent archetypes of capitalism and “forms of regulation” (Boyer, 2005).
2.2. Radical innovation across varieties  
of capitalism
Building upon older approaches to comparative economics and the French 
“Regulation” School – with varying degrees of acknowledgment – the liter-
ature on “varieties of capitalisms” (Hall and Soskice, 2001) draws a distinc-
tion between liberalized market economies (LMEs) and coordinated mar-
ket economies (CMEs). In LMEs, the coordination of individual decisions is 
mainly entrusted to markets, whereas non-market mechanisms, entailing 
a higher degree of centralization, characterize CMEs. Following Hall and 
Soskice (2001), economies can be clustered according to two dimensions: 
stock market capitalization (higher in LMEs) and employment protection 
(higher in CMEs). Credit-based economies tend to fall within the CME cat-
egory, whereas market-based financial systems are typical of LMEs1. Hall 
and Soskice (2001) went on to hypothesize a mapping between varieties 
of capitalism and technological comparative advantage. Specifically, they 
claimed that LMEs specialize in radical innovation, whereas CMEs have a 
comparative advantage in incremental innovation. This resonates some-
what with our previous discussion on evolutionary taxonomy.
1 A third group of countries is also identified by Hall and Soskice with a mixed mar-
ket economy (MME) model, or “Mediterranean capitalism”. These too bear similari-
ties with credit-based economies.
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The first test of the Hall-Soskice hypothesis was provided by the authors 
themselves in their 2001 book. They compared the aggregate number of 
patents granted to German and US firms in “radical innovation” indus-
tries (biotechnology, semiconductors, software, telecommunication equip-
ment) and in “incremental innovation” industries (machine tools, con-
sumer durables, engines, specialized transport equipment). LMEs were 
found to prevail in terms of patents granted to firms operating in “radi-
cally innovative” sectors. Relying on similar notions of “radicality”, Allen 
et al. (2006) and Schneider and Paunescu (2012) found that LMEs export 
more heavily in high-tech industries. These results therefore indirectly 
testify to the higher propensity of economies with market-based financial 
systems to explore new technological paradigms.
The Hall-Soskice hypothesis tests were subsequently refined, partly refut-
ing the original results. Taking the CME-LME taxonomy for granted, the 
analysis was recast at the industry level of aggregation, and arguably bet-
ter indicators of radicality were proposed. Taylor (2004) contended that 
the higher radicality of innovation in market-based systems resulted 
from the inclusion of the US in the sample, and showed this through data 
on patents and scholarly publications (both simple counts and citations-
weighted). Along with patent citation counts, Akkermans et al. (2009) 
compared CMEs and LMEs using measures of generality (the “breadth” 
of innovation) and originality (the extent to which the innovation drew 
knowledge from other innovations). The claim that LMEs enjoy a compar-
ative advantage in radical innovation was only confirmed in some indus-
tries, in the same way that only some CMEs specialize in industries that 
are in their “radical” life-cycle stage.
The uncertain status of the Hall-Soskice hypothesis hints at the role of 
firm-level heterogeneity in making technological comparative advantage 
not only industry- but also firm-specific. Jackson and Miyajima (2007) 
argued that country-specific firm-level heterogeneity – in size, industry 
experience, capabilities, etc. – is so wide, that different varieties of cap-
italism (e.g. different financing patterns) can coexist within the same 
economy. Goutas and Lane (2009) showed that Anglo-Saxon models of cor-
porate governance have been adapted by different German firms in quite 
idiosyncratic ways. And quite a few examples can be cited regarding Anglo-
Saxon firms having a relation with finance akin to the “corporatist” type.
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2.3. The myopia and weakness of market selection
In credit-oriented systems, the existence of a tangled web of financial 
relationships suggests that product and financial markets should play 
a marginal role in selection across firms. The most productively effi-
cient and profitable companies are not necessarily those enjoying faster 
growth. Indeed, Coad (2007 & 2010) found, through panel data analyses of 
French firms, that while employment growth and sales growth precede 
the growth of profits, higher profits do not translate to faster growth. 
Bottazzi et al. (2010) investigated the links between productivity, profita-
bility and growth on panels of Italian and French manufacturing firms, 
to similarly find that the estimated relationships between firm growth 
and profitability appear to be weak or not significant across countries and 
industrial sectors.
Bottazzi et al. (2006) made use of a financial rating index (ranking the 
expected ability to repay debt) to analyze a dataset of Italian firms in 
the period 1996-2003. Both very small and very large firms are concen-
trated within the high risk and less solvable categories. The same firms 
experience much more unstable growth records. While smaller firms are 
more likely to be constrained in raising external financing, larger firms 
face problems only when they are highly leveraged. Bottazzi et al. (2008) 
found non-trivial relationships between risk class and firm performance 
in a sample of Italian firms. The worse the credit conditions, the worse 
the profitability and productivity records would supposedly be. Yet, it was 
found that badly rated (i.e. potentially credit-constrained) firms are not 
necessarily among the worst performing, confirming the inefficiency of 
the credit market as a selection mechanism.
In Bottazzi et al. (2014), financial constraints, measured through low 
credit ratings, upset the ability of large firms to exploit the positive 
effects of diversification. On the one hand, firms that already witness a 
reduction in sales see their performance worsen in the presence of finan-
cial constraints (a “loss reinforcing” effect). This effect is more strongly 
observed amongst older firms. On the other hand, firms experiencing pos-
itive growth rates are likely to see their growth potentials deprived if they 
meet their financial constraints (a “pinioning the wings” effect). This evi-
dence is more common across younger firms and results in a net loss in 
growth opportunities.
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It is however enlightening to learn that the same evidence put forth 
by Bottazzi et al. (2010) is also found in countries as diverse as France, 
Germany, the UK and the USA by Dosi et al. (2015). Market selection forces – 
as mediated by differential profitabilities – are equally weak in mar-
ket-oriented systems (UK, USA) as they are in credit-based economies 
(France, Germany). Moreover, as Bianchini et al. (2014) show, persis-
tent high-growth performances do not appear to be correlated with sys-
tematically different financial conditions, concerned with interest pay-
ments and leverage levels, in a set of countries characterized by different 
financial systems, such as France, Italy, Spain and the UK. For those who 
refuse to accept the far-fetched Modigliani-Miller theorem as evidence, 
this hints at the possible irrelevance of finance below the rationing 
constraints.
The absence of a solid relationship between profitability and growth is 
verified in different financial and organizational set-ups and militates 
against the idea that profits, through investments, feed growth. Selection 
seems instead to occur within firms, under different operational channels 
(for instance the replacement of older production processes by improved 
ones).
Further evidence related to entrepreneurial finance is consistent with the 
above insights. In stock market segments catering to small caps, IPO com-
panies are assisted by specialized financial intermediaries, called nomi-
nated advisers or sponsors, who act as gatekeepers and regulators of the 
listed companies (see also Revest and Sapio 2013b, 2014; Hornok 2014; 
Posner 2009). Deregulating the listing process is supposed to magnify the 
role of markets in selecting between companies. Yet, since Pagano et al. 
(1998), it is rather clear that capital raising is not the main reason behind 
the decision to go public (see also Brau and Fawcett, 2006). Comparing 
listed and unlisted US companies, Asker et al. (2015) show that listed firms 
invest less than their privately-held counterparts, and their investments 
are less sensitive to growth opportunities. Revest and Sapio (2013a) reveal 
that a “junior” stock market in the London Stock Exchange group (i.e. 
the AIM) tends to attract companies with higher-than-average growth in 
operating revenues and assets, and has nurtured the growth of employees 
of its listed companies; but such growth has not translated into superior 
value added growth, causing listed companies to underperform in produc-
tivity terms. It appears that even when markets pick relatively promising 
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companies, the post-IPO real performance – and the associated learning – 
can be disappointing.
Reliance on specialized investors catering to startups, such as venture 
capitalists, apparently has not improved the quality of market selection. 
One of the defining features of venture capital (VC) is its claimed provi-
sion of advice in strategic decision-making, as well as in technological syn-
ergies and business contacts and in recruiting key employees (Hellmann 
and Puri, 2002; Dushnitsky, 2006; Ernst et al., 2005; Maula et al., 2005). 
The diffusion of VC is highly asymmetric across financial systems, with 
market-oriented systems such as the US and UK playing the lion’s role, as 
shown by Revest and Sapio (2012) and the references therein. However, 
VC can also flourish in systems more inclined to foster learning if VC 
plays a coach function, while at the same time VC funding can have a pos-
itive effect on firm growth due to VC acting as a scout, which would be 
more likely in systems favoring selective pressure. The evidence so far is 
mixed. In a sample of companies listed on the Euro.NM circuit, Bottazzi 
and Da Rin (2002) failed to find any significant effect from venture capi-
tal funds on employment and sales growth, despite controlling for endo-
geneity and unobserved heterogeneity. Research by Baum and Silverman 
(2004) in Canada (a market-based system), and by Colombo and Grilli (2010) 
and Bertoni et al. (2011) in Italy (a credit-based system), show that real per-
formance in venture-backed firms is mainly guided by learning efforts, 
as they provide evidence that venture capitalists perform essentially a 
coaching function. According to Engel and Keilbach (2007), German ven-
ture-backed firms display faster employment growth than their non-ven-
ture-backed peers after controlling for endogeneity, showing that venture 
capitalists are both coaches and scouts. The quantile regression estimates 
by Audretsch and Lehmann (2004) on German companies listed on the 
Neuer Markt reveal that venture capital improves the growth perfor-
mance for average firms, but not for fast growers.
It is also worthwhile recalling that with dispersed shareholding, even 
a financial system centered on equity may prove less transparent than 
a credit-based system to outside investors (Bhide 1993), notwithstand-
ing the formally stronger investor protection offered in the Anglo-Saxon 
legal frameworks. But then, what selects across firms? The most entic-
ing conjecture, in our view, is that product market selection across firms 
is there but operates with a lot of noise and relatively weakly, especially 
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when firms are diversified and operate on different markets (more in 
Dosi et al., 2015). Conversely, in market-based, though also increasingly in 
(ex?) credit-based systems, financial markets may perform fast and deep, 
however this is according to criteria that are not correlated or even anti-
correlated with the performance of firms in terms of growth (and inno-
vation). And this is matched by strategies followed by non-financial firms 
in order to seek quick returns, no matter the long-term consequences (see 
Section 3).
2.4. Patenting for finance
One instance of how corporate strategies have shifted their focus from 
product to financial markets comes from the literature on patents. Firm-
level empirical studies dealing with the impact of finance on innovation 
have multiplied in recent years (see for instance Aghion et al., 2013; Chava 
et al., 2013; Ferreira et al., 2014), often measuring innovation as the number 
of patents or the number of patent citations (see also Mann, 2015 and for a 
review Kerr and Nanda, 2014). Some of the results from this literature are 
interpreted as supporting the superiority of market-based systems in fos-
tering innovation (Hsu et al., 2014). Importantly, though, the literature on 
Intellectual Property Rights has demonstrated the strategic use of patent 
applications, at times even highlighting harmful effects from the prolifer-
ation of patents, such as the “patent thicket” phenomena (Shapiro, 2001), 
amplifying anti-commons dynamics (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; see also the 
analysis in Levin et al., 1987; Dosi and Stiglitz, 2014).
Patents may be a revealing, albeit noisy, proxy for product market inno-
vation, but they can also be a part of a “signaling strategy” for the finan-
cial markets, irrespectively of the intrinsic innovative value of patents 
themselves. Several recent studies deserve to be mentioned in this respect 
as they provide insights to the “ultimate” role of patents. Recent results 
tend to show that patents are increasingly used as debt collateral in large 
companies (Mann, 2015; see also Hochberg et al., 2014). Since 2003, 16% of 
the aggregate stock of patents at the USPTO has been pledged as collat-
eral, while companies with patent-backed debt have performed over 40% 
of USPTO patenting (Mann, 2015). Firms with significant patent activ-
ity tend to receive cheaper bank loans than peers (Chava et al., 2013). 
Another dimension of the story points towards the interactions between 
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patents and stock market valuation. Bernstein (2015) examined the impact 
on innovative firms of being listed on the Nasdaq2. He found that the 
number of patents filed declined after the Nasdaq IPO (compared with 
otherwise similar private firms). Together, there is a sizable decline of 
about 40% in innovation novelty, measured by patent citations. In addi-
tion, newly listed firms are often faced with the departure of the most 
competent inventors and with a decline in the productivity of the inves-
tors that stay. Finally, listed firms engage more easily in external inno-
vation than privately-held firms, acquiring a substantial number of pat-
ents through M&A. These results suggest that the already weaken form 
of financialization implied by “going public” has an effect – and a nega-
tive one indeed – on innovative efforts. While Bernstein (2015) interprets 
this as evidence of agency costs and the related managerial incentives, in 
our view this evidence thoroughly illustrates the strategic use of patents 
to achieve a Nasdaq listing. It is quite remarkable that credit-based econo-
mies witness very similar phenomena when market-based institutions are 
imported. Engel and Keilbach (2007) found that venture capital funding 
did not enhance post-investment innovativeness in a sample of German 
firms, essentially because venture capital is more likely to flow to compa-
nies with higher ex-ante patent counts.
Interestingly, results in Benfratello et al. (2008) on Italian firms prove 
that innovation can be supported by credit-based systems as well. Relying 
on firm-level data over the 1990s, the authors underline a positive and sig-
nificant effect of banking development on the probability that local firms 
introduce process or product innovation. This effect is more sizable for 
small firms and for firms in high-tech sectors.
2.5. Finance might matter less for industrial 
dynamics than real factors, but…
Overall, the foregoing empirical results make it hard to discriminate 
among financial systems with regards to their Schumpeterian efficiency.
Let us start by remarking that a good deal of the expansion activities of 
incumbent firms is financed via retained cash flows (as shown by Fazzari 
2 The study covers the period 1983-2006/2009.
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et al., 1988, Fazzari and Petersen, 1993 and follow-ups),3 and thus are most 
often R&D activities, even in the US (Hall et al., 1998; Brown et al., 2009; 
Brown and Petersen, 2009; see also Hall, 2002 for a review). Consequently, 
on average, the institutional features of the financial system and the asso-
ciated advantages and disadvantages of different forms of financing matter 
little in investment and R&D decisions. Moreover, on average, real factors 
are also significant drivers of firm growth and firm defaults. So, productiv-
ity differentials are an important (though not overwhelming) determinant 
of differential output growth (cf. Bottazzi et al., 2010 and Dosi et al., 2015).
Furthermore, as Bottazzi et al. (2011) show, when firm default models are 
made to include both financial variables and real predictors, including 
productivity, profitability, size and growth variables, one finds, in the 
case of Italian limited liability manufacturing companies, that defaulting 
firms are on average more financially exposed, but that they are also less 
productive and less profitable in all the years before the default occurs. 
Conversely, higher levels of productivity and profitability reduce the prob-
ability of default.
However, in evolutionary worlds, the tails distributions are crucial, and 
on the tail finance is quite important, both on the good and bad sides. As 
already mentioned in Section 2.2, a fringe group of “good” well-performing 
firms is led to bankruptcy due to primarily financial reasons. Moreover, it 
is the tail of young (and thus generally smaller) firms which are affected 
by the challenge of getting financed. This has been partly overcome, espe-
cially in the last three decades, by resorting to equity finance both in 
market-based countries (US, UK) and in credit-based ones (Germany), and 
partly through an increasing institutional variety labelled as “entrepre-
neurial finance”, which includes venture capital, private equity, business 
angels and crowdfunding (Mina and Lahr, 2015). In any event, the pref-
erence for equity over loans does not seem to be a foundational feature of 
market-based systems. As Berger and Udell (1998) suggest, the prioritized 
financing that is adopted depends on industry-specific or firm-specific 
traits, such as experience and collateralizable assets. Moreover, the reli-
ance on equity vs. debt says nothing about the “patience” of the financial 
investment which, as we shall discuss below, is crucial in shaping the rates 
and directions of innovative research.
3 See also the debate between Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000) and Fazzari et al. 
(2000), as well as the review in Whited (2006).
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3. FINANCIALIZATION IN GENERAL,  
AND THE MAXIMISING SHAREHOLDER VALUE 
(MSV) PRINCIPLE, IN PARTICULAR
Since the 1980s, economies have undergone a process commonly known 
as financialization, revealed at a very first approximation by the rapid 
explosion of finance in comparison with all real sectors of the economy, 
alarmingly similar to the spread of a tumor. The financialization process 
is evidence of “the increasing role of financial motives, financial mar-
kets, financial actors and financial institutions” (Epstein, 2005, p.3). 
Financialization has also been defined in the literature as a “pattern of 
accumulation in which profits accrue primarily through financial chan-
nels, then through trade and commodity production” (Krippner, 2005, 
p.174), as well as being viewed as a change to the regime of profit accumu-
lation that signals the transition from managerial capitalism to investor 
capitalism (Boyer, 2000 and 2005; Foster, 2007; Guttmann, 2015; among 
others).
Although there is increasing evidence that financialization has affected 
the economy at various levels (expansion of the financial industry, new 
corporate strategies, new employee compensation schemes), two impor-
tant issues remain under-explored: i) has financialization transformed 
the relationships between finance, innovation and growth, and through 
which channels? And ii) has financialization altered the properties of the 
two financial system archetypes, credit-based versus market-based, and 
by what specific means? While our aim is not to offer a wholly defini-
tive answer to these questions, we will however go on to review some fac-
ets of the financialization process, and then follow with a discussion on 
the so-called principle of “maximizing shareholder value” which thor-
oughly illustrates the impact of financialization on firm-level innovative 
behavior.
3.1. Financialization patterns
The term “financialization” has several meanings, depending on the level 
of analysis and the financial mechanism being examined (see Krippner, 
2005 and Van der Zwan, 2014 for reviews).
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Broadly speaking, financialization can be linked to the increasing eco-
nomic and political power of a particular class, the “rentiers”, sustaining 
“the equity culture” as documented by Dore (2008), i.e. the active promo-
tion of equity ownership by governments that started in the Anglo-Saxon 
economies of the 1980s. The ideology supporting such institutional trans-
formation was and still is based on the idea that stock market liquidity and 
capitalization stimulate innovation and economic growth. A concurrent 
theoretical support, reinforcing the above, can be traced back to develop-
ments in a branch of finance theory, offering a set of sophisticated tools 
for the valuation of financial assets, notwithstanding their occasional dis-
astrous results well before the 2008 crisis (cf. regarding the Black-Scholes 
model, MacKenzie and Millo, 2003).
Financialization has left its mark not only on Anglo-Saxon countries but 
also in other countries where norms, rules and tools typical of market-
based systems have been increasingly transplanted (see e.g. Vitols, 2005 
on Germany; Campbell and Pedersen, 2007 on Denmark; Jackson and 
Miyajima, 2007 on Japan). Financial innovation has come in the form of 
new financial instruments (e.g. increasingly complex derivatives) and 
new trading venues (such as the multilateral trading facilities instituted 
by the MiFID directive in the European Union), fostered by innovations 
in ICT that enable, for example, high-frequency finance. Among financial 
innovations, securitization appears to be a striking phenomenon that has 
also played a major role in the financial crisis of 2008 (see for instance 
Davis and Kim 2015). “Securitization has notably changed the nature of 
the relationship between the lender and the borrower, shifting debt from 
a concrete relationship with an entity (a bank) to an abstract connection 
with the financial market” (ibid, p. 12). This process has occurred alongside 
an expansion in trading volumes, most prominently in unregulated – and 
thus opaque – segments, as attested by the expansion of over-the-coun-
ter (OTC) trading that amounted to $197 trillion in 2004 and increased to 
$516 trillion by June 2007 (Dore, 2008).
Simultaneously, the proportion of financial assets, stock equities or mutual 
funds held by households expanded significantly (Keister, 2005; Fligstein 
and Goldstein, 2015). In the USA, since the 1980s the increasing involve-
ment of households in stock market trading, either directly or through the 
intermediation of mutual funds, has been actively promoted (Davis 2008), 
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accompanied by specific measures such as tax deductions for non-listed 
equity or by the shift from defined benefit to defined contribution pen-
sions (such as 401k plans; see Hacker, 2004). As Van der Zwan (2014) put it, 
this is the financialization of everyday life4. Together, the proportion of 
profits earned by financial corporations as a total has skyrocketed. In the 
USA, it was well below 10% in the 1950s, only to reach around 45% in the 
period immediately preceding the 2008 crisis. Not surprisingly, in recent 
years the financial industry appears to be the most profitable industry in 
the US (Kaplan and Rauh, 2010; Philippon and Reshef, 2013).
More closely related to our research aims, and to the above mentioned 
change in the balance of power, financialization seems to have hampered 
Schumpeterian efficiency, primarily by influencing the strategies of large 
firms (for empirical studies see Mazzucato and Tancioni, 2012; Leaver and 
Montalban, 2010; Lazonick and Sakinç, 2010; among others), whose gov-
ernance has increasingly embodied the so-called principle of Maximizing 
Shareholder Value (MSV), ousting other stakeholders from the decision-
making processes of large corporations.
3.2. The growing influence of the MSV principle
Currently, several mechanisms interact in the financialization of large 
firms. Mergers and acquisitions have multiplied since the 1980s (Fligstein, 
1993), as well as downsizing and sell-offs, driven by the adage that « the 
whole was worth less than the sum of the parts » (Davis and Kim, 2015, 
p. 12). During the same period, in the USA it became easier for external 
investors to execute takeovers because of less stringent antitrust guidelines, 
as well as changes in the anti-acquisition laws and financial innovations, 
leading to a frantic market for corporate control (Davis and Stout, 1992).
In 1982, American corporations obtained the right to repurchase their own 
stocks, with disastrous consequences for the use of profits diverted from 
investment and research uses (Lazonick, 2007; Lazonick and Mazzucato, 
4 Financialization seems to have also helped the stratification of the US population 
(Fligstein and Goldstein, 2015) with the upper-middle class active on the financial 
market in order to maintain a certain life style, and the lower class increasingly 
hooked on borrowing.
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2013). In addition, favorable corporate tax deductibility regimes fostered 
the use of stock options in executive compensation, that in turn boosted 
the value of the shares. Hence, corporate executives were motivated to 
manipulate stock prices in order to increase their compensations (Diprete 
et al., 2010; Zheng and Zhou, 2012). As a general trend, financialization has 
been characterized by a tremendous increase in financial pay-out ratios, 
in the form of interest payments, dividend payments and stock buybacks 
(Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000). This tendency is labelled by the authors 
as a shift from “a retain and reinvest strategy” to a “downsize and distrib-
ute strategy”.
The financialization of corporations goes together with the emergence of 
shareholder value as the main guiding principle for corporate behaviors. 
The MSV philosophy became dominant in the 1980s and, putting share-
holders at the center of the corporate scene, it was theoretically grounded 
in Agency Theory à la Fama and Jensen (for discussions, see Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan, 2000; Boyer, 2005; Dobbin and Jung, 2010; among others). As it 
stands, from this perspective corporate efficiency is indeed equivalent to 
MSV (Fligstein and Shin, 2007) – needless to say, within the conditions of 
informationally efficient markets. In such a world, maximizing the value 
of the firm and protecting investors would be considered the best ways to 
improve social welfare. Operationally, the MSV principle has also generated 
particular business practices through the introduction of specific financial 
performance indicators, such as the return on equity ratio, or the adoption 
of international accounting standards (see for instance Widmer, 2011).
A crucial issue is related to the impact of the MSV principle on the real 
economy, especially on firm-level innovative efforts. The growing atten-
tion granted to the MSV has influenced industrial organization, the inter-
nal organization of firms and their strategies, often at the expense of 
growth, innovation, and employment. And evidence on the matter has 
emerged from both sociological and economic studies.
Firstly, several scholars have pointed to the increase in financial port-
folio components of non-financial corporations since the 1980s (cf. from 
the more sociological camp, Krippner, 2005; Epstein and Jayadev, 2005; 
Tomaskovic-Devey et al., 2015). This increase is a consequence of redirect-
ing profits from production toward financial investments (Davis and Kim 
2015). The peculiarity of the financialized corporation, indeed, is that 
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financial gains are not re-invested in productive facilities, but distributed 
to shareholders, through dividend payouts and share buy-backs (Lazonick 
and O’Sullivan, 2000; Lazonick, 2010).
Secondly, firm-level case studies have shown that, during the late 1990s, top 
executives of major US high-tech corporations supported the speculative 
strategies of investors, transforming market speculation into capital gains 
through stock options (Lazonick, 2007). Carpenter, Lazonick and O’Sullivan 
(2003) have also demonstrated the extent to which the use of stock-based 
compensation made companies vulnerable during the crisis (in their case 
study they consider the Internet bubble). Several studies have focused on 
the pharmaceutical sector. As Mazzucato and Tancioni (2012) have shown, 
pharmaceutical companies that invest more heavily in technology turn out 
to experience more stock return volatility. This comes as an additional jus-
tification for diverting resources towards purely financial investments, to 
the detriment of innovation. In the same sector, Leaver and Montalban 
(2010) illustrate how Sanofi, the French pharmaceutical company, has in 
recent years used the stock market in order to perform revenue consolida-
tion, distribution and repatriation. Pisano (2006) emphasizes the unprofit-
ability of the US biotechnology industry throughout its recent history, even 
though it received large amounts of financial resources (including private 
and public equity, and R&D contracts). The “Pisano Puzzle” has been inter-
preted through the role of speculative behaviors on stock markets, espe-
cially on the Nasdaq (Lazonick and Tulum, 2011). In the USA, both biotech 
firms and large pharmaceutical corporations have received huge amounts 
of government funding through the National Institute of Health (NIH), yet 
stock market speculation has disconnected the financial resources from 
their main purpose: innovation. Lazonick and Sakinç (2010) reveal that 
pharmaceutical firms may remain listed on the Nasdaq for years, raising 
huge amounts of capital through IPO and seasoned equity offers, without 
generating new products, while also providing external R&D services.
The negative influence of the MSV principle on innovative practices has 
been recently interpreted as a tension between creation and extraction in 
the innovation processes. The increasing separation between actors who 
take risks and actors receiving the rents from innovation lies behind such 
tension (Lazonick and Mazzucato, 2013). On the value-creation side, “the 
collective character of the innovation process makes it difficult to meas-
ure the contribution of different actors to it, as their contributions are 
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intertwined” (ibid, p. 9), while it is much easier to appropriate value at 
the end of the process. Complex compensation mechanisms are devised in 
order to extract value, prominently involving buy-backs (outside the phar-
maceutical industry, see Lazonick, 2007 on Microsoft). A highly comple-
mentary dynamic is concerned with the development of private equity, a 
hallmark of a market-oriented financial system. This is visible in the work 
of Froud and Williams (2007) who interpret private equity as “a rearrange-
ment of claims which allow value capture and value creation for a small 
number of principals (private equity principals and senior managers)”. In 
a way, private equity helps to institutionalize and normalize value extrac-
tion (see also Erturk et al., 2010).
One of the key issues concerns the identity of the actors extracting 
value and the reasons behind their success. According to Lazonick and 
Mazzucato (2013), actors are highly diversified and can include managers, 
venture capitalists, bankers and hedge fund managers. These actors rely 
on the MSV principle: if they take the risk, they should receive a satisfic-
ing return on their investments. They act through different modes, such 
as lobbying behaviors on political decision-makers, in order to access spe-
cial grants. For instance, they use insider control over speculative stocks 
and other mechanisms such as stock-based compensation, legal manipu-
lation of the stock market through stock buybacks, IPOs and acquisitions.
One method of identifying more precisely at which level and in what way 
the value extraction occurs, consists of examining the various functions 
performed by the stock markets. The “theory of the innovative firm” pro-
vides a stimulating conceptual framework, throwing light on the distinct 
and interrelated functions performed by stock markets (Lazonick, 2007). 
In particular, the cash and compensation functions (and their interac-
tions) appear to create greater opportunities for value extraction. The cash 
function operates by providing liquidity, in which case the stock market 
broadens the array of financial sources available to the listed companies. 
Compensation is concerned with the use of corporate stock as remunera-
tion for employees and managers. Indeed, in the era of financialization, 
the “cash with compensation” functions appear to have become dominant 
at the expense of other functions5.
5 The other functions performed by the market are creation, control, and combina-
tion. Creation indicates the ability of the stock market to encourage the flow of 
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3.3. Short termism: what is the evidence?
While the financialization process of the non-financial corporation is 
grounded on the spread of the MSV principle, it is also likely to yield 
short termism, that is the shortening of the horizon over which corporate 
strategies are planned. Yet, few empirical studies deal with this subject. 
Short termism has at least two dimensions, firstly investor short termism, 
which has been extensively underlined by the literature on financializa-
tion, and secondly managerial short termism. Regarding the latter, the 
vast majority of top executives recognize, in surveys, that they are ready 
to cut or delay investment to meet short term targets in the same quarter. 
80% of survey participants in Graham et al. (2006) would decrease discre-
tionary spending to meet an earning target. Meeting and beating earning 
benchmarks are clearly very important to CEOs. In other words, compa-
nies sacrifice long-term value in response to intense pressure from the 
market. Furthermore, managers who wish to leave the firm tend to be 
interested by an increase in the stock price as a favorable signal on the job 
market for executives.
While it is frequently claimed that managers are myopic, not a lot of 
research has been done on the subject. Edmans et al. (2013) find that man-
agerial short termism leads to a reduction in real investments, including 
R&D, capital expenditures and advertising expenses. To measure manage-
rial short termism, the authors used the price sensitivity of equity vesting6 
over the upcoming year7. R&D is shown to be negatively associated with 
the price sensitivity of stocks and options that vest over the same year. 
Vesting equity increases the CEO stock price concerns, but it is not corre-
financial resources into new firm formation by providing a promise of liquidity at a 
later point in time. Control refers to the fact that, by affecting ownership, the stock 
market exerts an influence on the relationship between corporate owners and the 
managerial staff. Relatedly, combination concerns the property of corporate stock as 
currency in the transfers of the strategic control of firms, as in mergers and acquisi-
tions.
6 Vesting is the process by which an employee with a stock option becomes entitled 
to the benefits of ownership. The vesting schedule determines when an employee 
acquires full ownership (usually 3 to 5 years in the USA). During the vesting period 
the employee cannot sell or transfer stock or options.
7 The sensitivity is determined by equity grants made several years before and not 
linked to current investment opportunities.
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lated with investment opportunities. For their part, Ladika and Sautner 
(2015) show that the new US accountant regulation FAR 123R encourages 
firms to accelerate the vesting period of option grants and such vesting 
leads to a reduction in capital expenditure. Generally, when vesting peri-
ods are short, the probability that executives will try and boost short-term 
performance is higher8.
One attempt to establish a connection between financialization, short 
termism and real investment decisions of firms has been proposed by 
Orhaganzi (2008) in a study on US firms between 1973 and 2003, which 
shows that increased financialization affects real investments of non-
financial corporations. The effects involve two channels. First, high finan-
cial profit opportunities lead to higher financial investments that tend to 
crowd out real investments and modify managerial incentives. Second, 
the pressure to increase financial payout ratios (interest payments, divi-
dend payments and stock buybacks) results in lower levels of ‘real’ invest-
ment9. In both cases, increased payout ratios and increased financial 
investments contribute towards shortening the planning horizon of non-
financial firms.
Certainly, more research is needed on the subject, going back also to direct 
measures of payback periods, according to which firms decide to under-
take (or not) their investments in fixed capital and R&D projects. An early 
example is found in Mansfield (1988), whose comparative study of R&D in 
Japan and the USA sheds light on the shorter payback period for Japanese 
product and process innovations based on external technology.
3.4. Different archetypes do not match  
the historical evidence regarding investor protection
One major tenet of the MSV, emphasized within Law and Finance litera-
ture, is the necessity to protect investors in order to stimulate financial 
8 Recent empirical studies analyze the impact of short termism on innovation through 
patent data, but with the limitations of patents as innovation indicators that we 
have already mentioned (see Gao et al., 2014)
9 The negative effect of increased financial payout ratios is more pronounced for large 
firms.
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development (La Porta et al. 1997; 2000). However, comparative business 
and institutional history is at odds with such a notion.
Business historians show that in the past, the absence of laws offering 
investor protection did not impede the emergence and growth of stock 
markets (Mayer, 2008; Musacchio and Turner, 2013)10. During the first half 
of the 20th century, the UK operated a large and dynamic stock market 
without legal investor protection, and with an already sizable number of 
acquisitions (Franks et al., 2009). UK firms were very active in terms of 
acquisitions, and while they issued new shares to acquire other firms, they 
diluted the shareholding of the directors and the founders. Additionally, 
even without investor protection, insider trading in the UK stock markets 
was very moderate, and the separation of ownership from control did not 
harm shareholders (Campbell and Turner, 2011; Braggion and Moore, 2013; 
Foreman-Peck and Hannah, 2013).
In Germany, at the beginning of the 20th century, the new equity issu-
ance was largely invested in shares taken from other firms, but not in the 
form of firm acquisitions (Franks et al., 2006). Concentration of ownership 
did not decline, because banks maintained a large weight in the capital 
of the companies listed on the stock market. Equity finance was interme-
diated at this period in Germany, both by companies and banks. Another 
illustration is that of Japan. In the early 20th century, the Japanese stock 
markets were characterized by high ownership dispersion. Later, under 
the influence of the United States and following World War II, the legal 
framework was transformed to represent tougher protection of investor 
rights (Franks et al., 2014). Nevertheless, at the same time banks and com-
panies had preserved cross shareholdings, which rose up against a regula-
tion that strongly favored dispersed ownership.
Overall, Mayer (2008) concluded that at the beginning of the 20th century 
the development of various stock markets was not stimulated by investor 
protection, but by institutional set-ups including well-structured boards 
and, above all, trust relationships. In turn, trust was facilitated by the 
proximity between investors and directors (Musacchio and Turner, 2013; 
Braggion and Moore, 2013; Cheffin et al., 2013). In the UK, local stock 
10 See Business History (2013), “Special Issue on Law and Finance: A Business History 
Perspective”, coordinated by Musacchio and Turner.
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markets and local investors were at the very center of supporting trust 
and encouraging the growth of the market, while in Germany banks hold-
ing capital shares were playing a substantial intermediary role. In Japan, 
stock market trading relied on respected and prominent members from 
the business community (business coordinators) and the Zaibatsu families.
Throughout the history of stock markets, the evidence teaches us that the 
centrality of investors and investor protection has presented neither nec-
essary nor sufficient conditions for the mobilization of financial resources 
for corporate growth.
CONCLUSION: SOME ASSESSMENTS  
REGARDING THE EVOLUTIONARY PROPERTIES 
OF THE CURRENT FINANCIAL SYSTEM
Within this research, we have tried to assess the solidity of certain prop-
ositions concerned with the evolutionary properties of different financial 
regimes, put forward by Dosi (1990), in light of the last 25 years of finan-
cial innovation and institutional reform. Indeed, as it turns out these 
propositions tend to be more controversial than first believed.
First: “The more a system is ‘market-based’, the more it will increase environmental 
selection”. This proposition appears to be less the case than once thought at 
the time, or rather, in other words, market selection is highly imperfect 
even in market-based systems. The empirical micro evidence, unavaila-
ble at the time, suggests that irrespective of financial regimes, “learning” 
dominates “selection” as a determinant of firm growth. Moreover, due to 
the process of financialization, financial markets may have become more 
significant than product markets as “selectors” among companies, how-
ever if they are, they do so along criteria based on short-term returns. All 
of this deteriorates both static and Schumpeterian efficiency, an insight 
that is now palatable by even mainstream economists, and even more so 
after the last financial crisis.
Second: “Market-based systems seem to be more conducive to the exploration of 
new technological paradigms”. The empirical evidence produced over the last 
few decades suggests that the radical nature of innovation changes more 
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across industries than across financial systems. In addition, it would 
appear that innovation outcomes, such as patents, are increasingly con-
ceived as strategic weapons to access financial markets, somewhat revert-
ing the expected causality channel. More generally, there appears to be a 
disconnection between the determinants of innovation and growth, on 
one hand, and firm performance on the financial markets, on the other. 
As argued by Mazzucato (2013) and Lazonick and Mazzucato (2013), value 
extraction behaviors on stock markets negatively influence the explora-
tion of new technological paradigms, and even research within known 
paradigms. There is “in modern capitalist economies, an increasing sep-
aration between those economic actors that take the risk of investing in 
innovation and those who reap the rewards from innovation” (ibid, p.2). 
The dominance of the Maximization of Shareholder Value philosophy 
offers a general blessing to the value extraction process. In addition, short-
termist behaviors make the situation worse, because the very nature of 
the innovation process “creates a time lag between the bearing of risk and 
the generation of returns” (ibid, p. 9).
Third: “The more knowledge is asymmetric, appropriable and scarce, the more insti-
tutionalized processes of finance allocation will be conducive to evolutionary viabil-
ity”. Historical evidence suggests that in relation to financing innovation 
and sustaining growth, the distinction between the two archetypes is 
not so clear-cut. Conversely, the financialization process has contributed 
towards compressing and somewhat degrading the specific properties of 
the finance-innovation nexus in both financial systems.
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